West Asia War: Three Scenarios That Could Redraw Pakistan’s Trajectory
Scenario-building Pakistan’s strategic, economic, and internal security risks as the West Asian conflict deepens
The West Asian war is entering its fourth week, and at Takshashila, we are closely tracking developments through various publications, including podcasts, issue briefs, newsletters, and opinion pieces. For this Paigham, I conduct a thought experiment, considering three scenarios that could impact Pakistan.
Scenario 1: Gulf Enters the War
At the core of this scenario lies a document whose full text remains undisclosed. The Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA), signed in Riyadh in September 2025 by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, commits both parties to a single, if carefully worded, principle that “aggression against one shall be treated as aggression against both.” Effectively, the agreement bolsters earlier defence arrangements dating back to the 1960s. That said, it stops short of a treaty-bound, NATO-style collective defence architecture. Its ambiguity remains deliberate. What distinguishes this pact, however, is the implicit extension of security guarantees to Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent.
Saudi Arabia’s recent diplomatic position, including its mediatory role in the Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict, underscores its limitations of aligning with Islamabad.
For now, Islamabad has adopted a characteristically calibrated posture in the West Asian war. Its response to the unfolding crisis reflects an attempt to reconcile competing imperatives – close economic and strategic ties with the Gulf monarchies, a newfound closeness to the Trump administration, and the tricky geography of a shared, sensitive border with Iran. Pakistan’s participation in the recent foreign ministers’ meeting in Riyadh with other Arab and Gulf countries demonstrates diplomatic alignment, however not necessarily operational commitment.
What remains to be seen is how Islamabad interprets its obligations under the SMDA when confronted with real contingencies. Saudi Arabia’s threat perception is not abstract, and any escalation involving Iran could compel Pakistan into choices it would want to avoid. Direct military involvement against Tehran would risk igniting tensions along Pakistan’s southwestern frontier and also require a reallocation of military resources away from its primary theatre, the eastern border with India. An ongoing war with another neighbor, Afghanistan adds on to the prevailing complications.
The only meaningful precedent remains 2015, when Pakistan’s parliament refused to join the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. That episode exemplifies the outer limits of Pakistan’s strategic behaviour that informs rhetorical solidarity, material restraint.
Scenario 2: Hormuz Remains Blocked
The continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz has intensified Pakistan’s existing energy vulnerabilities. The country imports over 80 percent of its oil through the strait. As of March 16, Petroleum Secretary Hamed Yaqoob Sheikh informed a Senate committee that Pakistan holds crude oil reserves sufficient for 11 days, diesel for 21 days, petrol for 27 days, LPG for 9 days, and jet fuel (JP-1) for 14 days. LNG prices have increased by nearly 60 percent since the start of the conflict, with QatarEnergy suspending production following an Iranian attack. Qatar remains Pakistan’s primary LNG supplier, and these cargoes transit the now-blocked strait.
Beyond immediate energy concerns, the fertiliser cascade presents a slower but equally consequential risk - one that might go unaddressed until food prices spike. Up to one-third of global fertiliser trade could be disrupted if the Hormuz closure persists in the coming weeks. Key producers across the Arab Gulf, including Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, are among the world’s leading nitrogen fertiliser exporters, with output heavily dependent on natural gas. Economically fragile Pakistan will find it challenging to absorb such shocks without a central bank response.
While some Pakistan-flagged vessels have reportedly been allowed to transit the strait, a prolonged energy crunch will inevitably spill over into daily life. This could include extended closures of schools and offices, among other austerity measures. Islamabad will likely seek alternative supply routes, including increased imports from Saudi Arabia, though such adjustments will take time and come at a cost.
The overall forecast is clear – Pakistan’s disinflation is unlikely to hold. Inflation might return to double digits as rising field costs bleed into transport, manufacturing, and food. An energy shock, along with increasing import bills, shrinking remittances, and disrupting industrial supply will make Pakistan’s balance sheet further fragile. Without external supply through financial packages from China or the Gulf, or an expanded IMF program – the situation is likely to become dire.
Scenario 3: The Baloch Trouble
Given Iran’s geography, and US’ domestic political situation – a ground invasion to achieve US/Israeli objectives will likely remain off the table. There remains no appetite among NATO members to put boots on ground at that scale. In that case, should the strategy of choice be indirect – involving the arming and funding of Kurdish and Baloch groups to pressurise the Iranian regime from within. For Pakistan, this scenario brings some more bad news. An unstable neighbor, especially of IRan’s size and complexity, is rarely confined to its borders – the 900-kilometre Pakistan-Iran frontier is among the most porous in the world, colored with deep ethnic, tribal and criminal cross-cutting ties. Pakistan’s Balochistan province and Iran’s Sistan-Balochistan are separated by a boundary – both host active ethno-separatist insurgencies, both have a weak state presence in remote areas, and Baloch populations on both sides have loyalties along tribal lines that predate modern states. If the Iranian regime’s hold on Sistan-Balochistan weakens - the province may become a ground for separatist groups to arm, plot, and launch attacks into Pakistani territory.
A glimpse of this was demonstrated following the Iran-Israel war of June 2024, where the Balochistan Liberation Army-Azaad chief Hyrbyair Marri surfaced months later with a formal charter for an independent Greater Balochistan, a propaganda effort that may be amplified the moment Iranian state authority visibly fractures. Meanwhile, the Islamic State Khorasan Province is already eyeing Balochistan to reconstitute its network, and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan is co-opting Baloch militant factions to expand into the Pashtun belt of the province – this could exacerbate Pakistan’s existing trilateral security challenge. Pakistan is in active conflict with Taliban in the north, shares an ever-sensitive border with India to the east, could possibly face challenges in its entire southwestern frontier.
Takshashila’s Desk:
China’s Quiet Military Aid To Iran - And Why Beijing Won’t Admit It - By Anushka Saxena
Iran, US and AI: Why 2026 will test Indian foreign policy establishment - By Lokendra Sharma
Will The Iran War Force Pakistan To Pick ‘Sides’? - By Aishwaria Sonavane
Nuclear deterrence and the Iran war - By Adya Madhavan